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Foreword
HonorableAllen Hartman*
"[Elvery one is responsible for the consequences of his own wrong,
and, if another person has been compelled to pay the damages which
the wrongdoer should have paid, the latter becomes liable to the
former."'

The foregoing statement, articulated in an indemnification setting, exemplifies the quest for simple equity and justice sought in
third-party actions by litigants, lawyers and the courts. Although
stated in many different ways and subjected to the vicissitudes
of developing procedural and substantive law, the quest itself
has remained constant for centuries. 2 The desire to allocate
equitably the burdens of liability for wrongs caused by others is
arguably the raison d'etre for third-party actions in common law.
The course of such actions, however, has been neither easy nor
straightforward.
Prior to 1955, Illinois civil procedure permitted a defendant to
bring into an ongoing suit a third party who was or might have
been liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against
him by tendering to that third party the defense of the action. If
the tender was rejected, the defense presented by the original
defendant would be conclusive upon the third party as to all
matters necessarily included in the adjudication. 3 The original
* Justice, Illinois Appellate Court, First District. B.S.L. 1957, LL.B. 1959, J.D. 1970,
Northwestern University.
1. Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 217, 67 N.E. 439, 439 (1903).
Accord Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 90, 302 N.E.2d 40, 44 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Reath, ContributionBetween Persons Jointly Charged for NegligenceMerryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1898-1899), which traces common law contribution cases from the 17th century to the writer's own era, the late 19th century. Reath
collects and explains many English and American authorities which permitted actions
for contribution on similar equitable bases. Whereas many writers cited Merryweather as
stating the general rule that equity will not enforce contribution as between intentional
joint tortfeasors, Reath postulates that Merryweather actually states the exception. The
general rule, asserts Reath, is that "among persons jointly liable the law implies an
assumpsit either for indemnity or contribution ... "Id. at 177.
3. Sanitary Dist. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 392 Ill. 602, 612-13, 65 N.E.2d
364, 369 (1946).
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defendant then bore the burden and expense of defending the
original suit and of filing a second suit against the third party to
ameliorate any injustice that resulted from a judgment against
4
the defendant in the original lawsuit.
To avoid this circuitous and onerous procedure, Illinois adopted
a modern third-party practice procedure in 1955 by enacting section 25(2) of the Civil Practice Act, now section 2-406(b) of the
Code of Civil Procedure. 5 This section conforms with the underlying policy of the Practice Act, the Code and rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which favors the disposition, in a
single suit, of all issues between the parties and the avoidance of
multiplicity of actions and inconsistent results. 6 The statute
further provides for what is sometimes termed fourth and subsequent party actions as well, and sets forth the procedures to be
followed by the parties in pursuing these remedies. Of course,
section 2406(b) is procedural only and creates no third-party
substantive rights. For this reason, considerations of the substantive rules of law are inextricably intertwined in third-party
practice analysis.
Recently, much attention has focused upon third-party practice due to the expanded and creative application of implied
indemnity in tort and the legitimation of theories of contribution
and comparative negligence. Yet, third-party practice has long
been recognized as a useful and desirable procedure in other
fields of law, as in actions between sureties on the obligation of
another, 7 admiralty cases,8 actions on negotiable instruments, 9
and breach of warranty or other obligations of a seller of goods. 10
The erosion of the rule denying contribution between joint tortfeasors set forth in Merryweather v. Nixan has also heightened interest in third-party practice. Attenuation of the rule
occurred through the evolvement of various theories of implied

4. Jenner & Tone, Pleading,Parties and Trial Practice,50 Nw. U.L. REv. 612, 613-14
(1955).
5. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2406(b) (1981).
6. Feirich, Third-PartyPractice,1967 U. ILL L.F. 236, 237-38.
7. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130,
135 (1932) and cases therein collected.
8. Note, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the FederalCourts, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 123, 130 (1965) and cases therein collected.
9. Oulvey v. Converse, 326 Ill. 226,229, 157 N.E. 245, 247(1927) (codified at § 3-803 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26, 3-803 (1981)).
10.

ILL REv. STAT. ch 26,

11.

8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).

2-607(5Xa) (1981).
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contract for indemnification in tort liability, including "active"
' 12

and "passive" negligence, "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance,"
and "major" and "minor" fault, 13 often fashioned on unpredictable and ad hoc bases. The search for practical applications of
appropriate procedural rules to initiate and determine litigation
has intensified with the re-establishment of contribution among
unintentional tortfeasors and the recognition of comparative
negligence in many jurisdictions. Illinois, for instance, has
14
recently adopted a comparative negligence standard in Alvis v. Ribar,
and has witnessed a resurgence of contribution actions following
the supreme court decision in Skinner v. Reed-PrenticeDivision
PackageMachinery Co.' 5 and the enactment of a statute governing contribution among joint tortfeasors.' 6 These developments
have increased appreciation of the utility of third-party procedure in Illinois.
This symposium on third-party practice is thus particularly
timely and useful. It examines third-party practice in various
contexts of tort law following Skinner, including consideration of
joint and several liability addressed in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,17 recently decided by the Illinois Supreme Court. Also
considered is the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction, which
permits the addition of parties when the claims by or against
them would not, standing alone, support federal jurisdiction.
Procedural and substantive methods for shifting liability to third
parties are also examined. Student notes forming the balance of
the symposium include: a survey of contribution statutes across
the fifty states, analysis of contribution in antitrust actions, the
future of comparative negligence in Illinois, the effect of contribution on parent-child tort relationships, the application of contribution principles with reference to special statutory actions,
such as the Illinois Dram Shop Act, and the proposal of a uniform standard for resolving conflicts between indemnity and
contribution.

12. Note, supra note 8.
13. ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS. CivI, Nos. 500.02, 500.22 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.).
14. 85 Ill.
2d 1,421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
15. 70 Ill.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc., v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978) (abolishes the no-contribution rule, allowing a cause of action by the defendant against a third
party based on relative degree of fault).
301-305 (1981).
16. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 70,
17. No. 56306, slip op. (Il. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
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The symposium is informative, practical and valuable to the
legal profession and the courts and demonstrates the usefulness
of continuing analysis of the law, as well as proposed procedures
and remedies, of third-party practice for the future.

